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Abstract. Institutional change explains the change of institutions considered as rules and 
expectations that govern human interactions and paths of development in society. This 
conceptual paper describes, with an historical perspective, the most important definitions of 
institution and of institutional change and shows some theories that analyze these critical 
topics in economics to assess similarities and differences. The future challenge of 
institutional scholars concludes this study.  
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1. Introduction 
nstitutional theory is a discipline to explain both individual and organizational 
actions. A main research field of the institutional theory is the analysis of how 
institutions change over time. As a matter of fact, institutions can shape the 
nature of change across different levels and contexts, as well as themselves change 
in character, behavior and potency over time and space (Dacin et al., 2002; Di 
Maggio et al., 1991; Milgrom et al., 1990; Williamson, 2000). A debate within this 
research field is how to conceptualize institutions and institutional change. 
Literature suggests different definitions of institution that of course affect the 
perspectives to study and explain institutional change (cf., Kingston & Caballero, 
2009; Hodgson, 2006).  
Veblen (1899, p.190) argues that institutions are: ‚prevalent habits of thought 
with respect to particular relations and particular functions of the individual and of 
the community‛. Hayek (1973) considers institutions based on shared expectations 
in society, rather than rules.  
North (1990, p.3; 2005) states that institutions are: ‚the rules of the game in a 
society, or more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction… reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life‛. In this 
approach, institutions are based on formal rules (such as, laws and constitutions) 
and informal constraints (such as, conventions and norms). Aoki (2001, 2007) 
defines institutions as stable and shared systems of beliefs about the expected 
behavior of the members of a society in various contingencies. Greif (2006, p.30) 
adopts a broad definition of institution: ‚a system of rules, beliefs, norms and 
organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior‛. In brief, 
North (1990) sees institutions as rules, whereas Aoki (2007, p.6) views institutions 
as ‚selfsustaining, salient patterns of social interactions‛ that give rise to ‚common 
knowledge among the players regarding a particular equilibrium path of the game‛. 
These scholars suggest different definitions of institution and different approaches 
that explain institutional change, given by (Figure 1): designed-based, evolutionary 
theories of institutional change and equilibrium perspective (cf., Kingston & 
Caballero, 2009).  
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Figure 1. Theories of institutional change 
 
2. Institutions and theories of institutional change: An 
historical overview  
2.1. Designed-based theories of institutional change 
In this approach, institutional change is a centralized and collective-choice 
process in which rules are explicitly specified by a collective political entity, such 
as the community or the state, and individuals and organizations engage in 
collective action, conflict and bargaining. Libecap (1989) analyzes the sources of 
‚property rights‛ rules and considers rule-changing activity as ‚contracting‛: a 
game governed by a higher level of political rules, and these higher-level rules, 
together with the activities and perceptions of actors, can shape the direction of 
institutional change of the lower-level (property rights) rules. Libecap (1989, p.16) 
argues that exogenous parameter shifts are the prime factor of institutional change. 
If a parameter shift can lead to a change in the property-rights rules, it depends on 
the distribution of benefits. Libecap (1989) also claims that institutional change is a 
‚path-dependent‛ process: the institutions may be a function of current technology, 
but also of precedent institutions and technologies 1.  
Ostrom (2005) recognizes both exogenous causes of institutional change (e.g., 
technological change) and endogenous causes (e.g., the depletion of a resource 
over time). Ostrom (2005) also distinguishes between ‚operational rules‛, which 
govern day-to-day interactions, ‚collective choice rules‛ (rules for choosing 
operational rules), and ‚constitutional rules‛ (rules for choosing collective-choice 
rules), whereas ‚meta constitutional rules‛ are for choosing constitutional rules 
(e.g., the ‚rules‛ by which a civil war is fought). The process of institutional 
change is that: each individual calculates their expected costs and benefits from an 
institutional change, and if a ‚minimum coalition‛ necessary to effect change 
agrees to it, an institutional change can occur. A ‚minimum coalition‛ is 
determined by higher-level rule, such as in a democracy, a majority would 
constitute a winning coalition. Ostrom (2005) argues that if the beneficiaries of 
institutional change cannot commit to compensate the losers, powerful groups may 
be able to block beneficial change or impose inefficient change. A further 
impediment to efficient institutional change is the bounded rationality of players: 
some or all players may hold incorrect beliefs about the likely effects of a proposed 
institutional change. Therefore, in these approaches by Libecap (1989) and by 
Ostrom (2005), an institutional change depends on higher-level rules and on how 
the decision makers perceive the likely effects of a change in rules. In this research 
stream, Alston (1996, pp.26-7) outlines that: ‚Institutional change can be thought 
of as the result of supply and demand forces in a society. We can think of 
demanders as constituents and suppliers as the government ... Institutional change 
results from the bargaining actions of demanders and suppliers.‛ 
However, these theories, based on institutional change as the outcome of a 
deliberate, collective-choice process of rule-creation, may not explain why formal 
rules fail to produce their intended outcome.  
 
 
11 Coccia, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2014, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2015, 2015a, 
2017, 2017a, 2018, 2018a, 2018b; Coccia & Benati, 2018; Coccia & Bellitto, 2018; Coccia & 
Cadario, 2014; Coccia & Rolfo, 2010; Coccia et al., 2015; Benati & Coccia, 2017. 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 5(4), M. Coccia, p.337-344. 
339 
2.2. Evolutionary theories of institutional change 
Many scholars analyze institutional change as an evolutionary process 
(Kingston & Caballero, 2009). Theories of evolutionary institutional change 
suggest that institutional change is due to human actions, such as learning, 
imitation, etc. The difference between evolutionary and designed-based theories is 
the role of the selection process determining which rules emerge and adapt in 
socioeconomic environments. Evolutionary theories do not consider a central 
mechanism (e.g., legislation) that causes a coordinated shift in the rules perceived 
by behavior or beliefs of players. New rules or behaviors are due to a decentralized 
selection process and, as a consequence, successful institutions adapt and growth in 
society, whereas unsuccessful institutions do not survive. In brief, new rules and 
patterns of behavior emerge from the uncoordinated choices of many individuals, 
rather than collective-choice or political processes. Evolutionary theory of 
institutional change by Veblen (1899) considers the concept of ‚habits of thought‛, 
where habits are durable and long-run adaptable propensities to think and act in 
particular ways. Veblen (1899, p.188, passim) also argues that: ‚the evolution of 
social structure has been a process of natural selection of institutions‛ – that is, a 
process of ‚natural selection of the fittest habits of thought‛, both through the 
‚selection of individuals endowed with the fittest temperament‛, and through the 
‚adaptation of individual temperament and habits to the changing environment 
through the formation of new institutions‛. Institutional change here is the 
simultaneous co-evolution of both shared prevalent habits of thought (institutions) 
and habits of individuals. Therefore, the current habits of thought, both shared and 
individual, are ‚received from the past‛, affected by the present, and together they 
jointly affect the future path of institutional change (cf., Brette, 2003). 
Hayek (1973) develops an evolutionary theory of institutional change based on 
selection at the level of social group, where rules of conduct ‚have evolved because 
the groups who practiced them were more successful and displaced others 
(p.18)….thinking and acting are governed by rules which have by a process of 
selection been evolved in the society‛ (p. 11). Hayek (1973) claims that group 
selection generates an overall configuration of rules that evolve towards an optimal 
configuration based on consistent general principles (the ‚law of liberty‛ based on 
protection of property rights). 
Young (1996) argues that historical accidents could lead to the selection of 
particular conventions, and that in the long run, the pattern of institutional change 
can follow a ‚punctuated equilibrium‛ process in which rapid switches between 
conventions are interspersed with long periods of stability. 
Knight (1995) argues that different sets of rules have different distributional 
consequences, such that different actors may favor the emergence of different 
rules. In particular, if some actors have greater bargaining power than others, 
Knight (1995) claims that this may systematically affect the type of rule that 
becomes widely-used by the overall society. Levi (1990) stresses that formal rules 
can give ‚power‛ to certain groups, and that disadvantaged groups may force 
institutional change by ‚withdrawing their consent‛ from existing institutional 
arrangements. This withdrawal of consent could take the form of organized 
collective action, but it might also occur through the decentralized actions of many 
individuals.  
Overall, then, evolutionary theories and the design-based theories consider 
exogenous parameter changes as a prime factor of institutional change.  
Veblen (1899) argues that changes in population and technology guide 
institutional change by ensuring that current institutions and habits of thought, 
inherited from the past, are never ideally suited to the requirements of the present. 
Hence, institutions and habits are continually evolving: ‚The evolution of society is 
substantially a process of mental adaptation on the part of individuals under the 
stress of circumstances which will no longer tolerate habits of thought formed 
under and conforming to a different set of circumstances in the past‛ (Veblen 1899, 
p.192).  
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Instead, Ayres (1944, p.187) considers exogenous technological progress as the 
main driver of institutional change: ‚technological development forces change 
upon the institutional structure by changing the material setting in which it 
operates‛. However, Ayres (1944, p.175) also claims that institutions are resistant 
to change, which can threaten existing patterns of status, wealth and power. In this 
context, Nelson (2005, p.169) considers changes in physical technology as the 
main driver of institutional change: ‚it probably is useful to think of physical and 
social technologies as coevolving‛2.  
In short, evolutionary theories neglect the role of collective action and political 
process, while theories which view institutional change as the outcome of a 
centralized collective-choice process have difficulty explaining changes in informal 
rules (e.g., social norms) which evolve in a decentralized manner. In fact, North 
(1990, p.91) provides to informal rules a central role in institutional change. 
Informal rules are reproduced through an evolutionary process of cultural 
transmission, and play a key role in institutional change because they change 
slowly and cannot be changed deliberately. According to North (1990), 
institutional change is accumulation of many small changes rather than occasional 
large changes. The process of institutional change is path-dependent because 
individuals learn, organizations develop, ideologies form in the context of a 
particular set of formal and informal rules. Organizations can change formal rules 
to their benefit, and may (indirectly) affect the informal rules. Roland (2004) 
suggests an analogy between institutional change and tectonic pressure along fault 
lines (changes in slow-moving institutions) that build up continuously but slowly, 
but can suddenly provoke an ‚earthquake‛ that causes abrupt and substantial 
changes in fast-moving institutions (i.e., formal rules). Hence, both North (1990) 
and Roland (2004) assume that changes in informal rules, rather than formal rules, 
are the main drivers of institutional change. 
 
2.3. Theories of the equilibrium view of institutions 
The approach of Equilibrium Perspective endeavors to treat formal and informal 
rules within a unified framework by shifting the focus from the rules governing 
behavior to the behavior itself (Aoki 2001; Calvert 1995; Greif & Laitin, 2004; 
Myerson, 2004). In fact, the Equilibrium Perspective of institutions considers the 
essential role of both formal and informal rules as devices that enable players to 
coordinate on one of these many equilibria by helping them to achieve a shared set 
of beliefs about each other’s behavior both on and off the path of play. Calvert 
(1995, pp.22-23) claims that: ‚Institution is just a name we give to certain parts of 
certain kinds of equilibria.‛ Institutions are identified with these equilibrium 
patterns of behavior rather than rules that induce the behavior. In the Equilibrium 
Perspective, institutional change is due to changing expectations, rather than 
changing rules. Moreover, theories based on institutions as rules consider the 
enforcement of rules separately from their content; in the Equilibrium Perspective, 
in contrast, enforcement is endogenous. Exogenous parameter shifts, such as 
changes in technology or preferences, can disrupt equilibrium, leading individuals 
and organizations to change the ‚formal rules‛ in order to achieve a coordinated 
shift of many players beliefs about each others’ strategies.  
Greif & Laitin (2004) highlight the importance of endogenous institutional 
change and introduce the term ‚quasi-parameters‛, which are exogenous in the 
short run, but which gradually change as a result of the play of game, such as the 
income distribution, or the information available to the players. Hence, changes in 




2cf., Coccia, 2005a, 2015b, 2016, 2017b, 2018e, 2018f. 
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3. Conclusion 
Oliver (1992) and Scott (2001) argue that the institutional theory literature has 
focused on institutional construction and on convergent change processes. 
However, an equally important research topic is deinstitutionalization: "the 
processes by which institutions weaken and disappear" (Scott, 2001, p.182). Scott 
(2001, p.184) states that: ‚it is useful to place studies of deinstitutionalization in a 
broader context of institutional change, since the weakening and disappearance of 
one set of beliefs and practices are likely to be associated with the arrival of new 
beliefs and practices‛. Other directions in studies of institutional change are on 
transnational processes and field-level investigations involving multiple 
organizations or populations of organizations that cut across industries and 
societies. The actors here are likely to be collective, ranging from social groups 
within organizations to various field-level collaborations of organizations.  
According to Dacin et al., (2002), a great potential in institutional theory is also 
to explore the moral dimension of institutions and institutional change (Bellah et 
al., 1991; Selznick, 1992; Wolfe, 1989). Finally, some scholars have also 
highlighted the critical interaction between institutions and individual self and 
character to explain institutional change (cf., Scott, 2001; Bellah et al., 1991). To 
conclude, the challenge for institutional scholars is to continue to explore and 
exploit the diversity of viewpoints within the domain of institutional theory as well 
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